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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consider a corporation that has a longstanding and profitable business line 
with millions of customers who recognize the corporation’s national brand by 
its federally registered trademarks.  Then, after decades of use and multiple 
federal trademark renewals, the corporation suddenly loses its federal trademark 
protection because the trademark is determined to be scandalous, offensive, or 
disparaging to a small portion of the U.S. population by the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board.  For Pro-Football’s Washington Redskins franchise, this 
scenario is their reality, as the team’s federal trademark protection has been in 
jeopardy for over two decades now,1 accompanied by a dark cloud of negative 
economic consequences.  Although there is a common misperception about 
what the loss of federal trademark protection really means for Pro-Football,2 
the economic effects are more indirect.  Nevertheless, the sudden loss of a 
trademark is still problematic to a corporation who has built customer loyalty, 
identification, and goodwill through its national brand. 
As American culture has changed over the last century, racial stereotypes in 
advertising have diminished, and once-acceptable but now offensive trademarks 
have been cancelled, simply not renewed, or adapted to become more 
“politically correct” over time.3  Offensive or disparaging marks are generally 
bad for business, since people who are offended will not support the offensive 
product or service.4  Native Americans, however, do not have the same 
population size, political influence, and economic consumer power that many 
other ethnic groups have, and so their protests against disparaging trademarks 
have largely been ignored.5 
Racially charged brand names and advertising imagery are therefore less 
common in U.S. culture, except in regards to sports teams.  Ethnically related 
team names include the New York Knickerbockers, the Boston Celtics, and the 
Notre Dame Fighting Irish, but no team name and trademark has received 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999) (deciding to cancel the 
Redskins trademarks based on disparagement to Native Americans). 
 2 See Anne Gilson LaLonde, The Redskins Trademarks: What’s the Real Impact of the Board’s 
Cancellation Decision in Blackhorse?, 2014 EMERGING ISSUES, June 23, 2014, at 7209 (discussing the 
cancellation of the Redskins trademarks causing reports declaring that anyone can sell Redskins 
merchandise without punishment, or that the owner has no choice but to change the team’s 
name.  However, both of these statements are incorrect.). 
 3 See Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and The Doctrine of Disparagement: How 
Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 7, 8–11 (1994) (discussing the “Aunt 
Jemima” trademark owned by Quaker Oats Company, which was adapted over time to better 
conform with social mores). 
 4 Id. at 9. 
 5 Id. at 16. 
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more direct scrutiny than the Washington Redskins.  Although multiple team 
names reference Native Americans—the Atlanta Braves, Chicago Blackhawks, 
Cleveland Indians, Florida State Seminoles, and Kansas City Chiefs, to name a 
few—“[t]he Washington Redskins are the only . . . sports team whose name is 
an unequivocal racial slur . . .  [T]he name of Washington’s team--unlike the 
[other teams listed above]--is more than a mere racial reference.  It is an actual 
racial epithet.”6   
While the Redskins owner, Daniel Snyder, continues to argue that his team’s 
name represents “honor,” “pride,” and respect for Native Americans, others 
feel that the Redskins name is distasteful and offensive.7  University of Georgia 
Professor Claudio Saunt wrote, “[i]n light of the manifold struggles that 
America’s first inhabitants have faced, attaching any Indian name to a 
multimillion-dollar sports franchise seems the most incongruous of honors.”8  
A recent poll of over a thousand Americans showed that over seventy percent 
voted for the Washington Redskins to keep their nickname, but the percentage 
of people who believe the name should be changed has tripled in the last twenty 
years.9 
While many high school and college teams have changed their names as a 
result of societal pressure against the use of these Native American references, 
professional sports teams have been much less willing.10  The economic scale of 
professional sports teams like the Redskins may provide a strong reason for this 
resistance.  Forbes recently financially valued the Washington Redskins at $2.4 
billion (third highest of all NFL teams), with $214 million of that valuation 
attributable to its national “brand.”11  Changing their national brand would be 
very costly, considering the large investment the team has made in using its 
federal trademarks in advertising, the cost of designing and advertising a new 
name and logo, and the potential loss of brand equity and fan loyalty.12  The 
time and money to clear out old inventory and change hundreds of references 
                                                                                                                   
 6 Id. at 13 (quoting Clarence Page, Block that Trademarked Racial Epithet, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Sept. 23, 1992, at A9, available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1992-09-23/news/92092307 
03_1_washington-redskins-chicago-blackhawks-american-indian). 
 7 See Steve Wulf, Why Use of Native American Nicknames is an Obvious Affront, ESPN (Sept. 3, 
2014), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11426021/why-native-american-nicknames-stir-
controversy-sports. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Poll: 71 Percent Say Keep Redskins (Sept. 2, 2014), ESPN, http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/st 
ory/_/id/11451964/redskins-poll-most-favor-keeping-name-dissent-growing. 
 10 Wulf, supra note 7. 
 11 Washington Redskins Team Valuation, FORBES.COM (Aug. 2014), http://www.forbes.com/ 
teams/washington-redskins/. 
 12 Tim Devaney, What’s in a Name? Dumping ‘Redskins’ Could Have a Major Financial Impact, 
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/ 
17/renaming-the-redskins-could-have-a-major-financial/?page=all. 
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to the Redskins name in their stadium and with their sponsors raises additional 
concerns.13  On the other hand, if the Redskins ultimately decided not to 
change their team name and logo, losing its federal trademark protection could 
alternatively inflict indirect economic harm.   
This Note will not take a position on whether the “Redskins” trademarks 
are disparaging to Native Americans.  Instead, because of the economic harm 
that may result from suddenly losing federal protection, this Note will argue 
that there should be a higher evidentiary standard necessary to prove 
disparagement when the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board considers 
cancelling a well-known and tenured trademark, in comparison to when a 
trademark is initially reviewed for registration.   
Part II begins by discussing the fundamental principles of trademark 
protection, followed by a detailed overview of the Lanham Act and the benefits 
of federal registration.14  Of particular focus is Section 2(a), which deals with 
content-based prohibitions to registration, such as scandalous matter and 
disparagement.15  This part additionally summarizes the requirements and 
procedure for registration and subsequent petitions for cancellation and 
relevant precedent demonstrating the key differences in two specific federal 
evidentiary standards of proof.  Finally, this part provides a background of the 
Redskins’ trademark battle, including each side’s arguments, the previous court 
decisions, and where the case of Pro-Football v. Blackhorse16 currently stands.   
Part III will then provide legal analysis and economic reasoning for why a 
higher evidentiary standard should be required when the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board considers cancelling a well-known, tenured trademark based on 
disparagement.  Part IV concludes. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  THE PRINCIPLES OF TRADEMARK LAW 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides 
Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the 
several states, establishes the foundation for the federal regulation of 
trademarks.17  A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof” used in commerce “to identify and distinguish [a 
trademark owner’s] goods, including a unique product, from those 
                                                                                                                   
 13 Id. 
 14 The Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2012). 
 15 Id. § 1052(a). 
 16 See infra note 172. 
 17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.”18  
Justice Frankfurter described trademark protection as “the law’s recognition of 
the psychological function of symbols.”19  
Trademark law evolved from unfair competition laws developed in the 
1700s in both the Courts of Chancery (Equity) and Courts of Law.20  The 
Courts of Law treated trademarks as a way to protect the public from fraud and 
deceit, while the Courts of Chancery viewed trademark rights as a form of 
property.21  This dual view of trademark law provides the fundamental policy 
reasons for trademark protection: (1) to protect consumers from confusion and 
deception as to the source of the product, and (2) to protect the trademark 
owner’s property rights.22 
Modern courts still recognize these two statutory goals.  As a Senate Report 
accompanying the Lanham Act’s introduction in 1946 states: 
The purpose underlying any trademark statute is twofold.  One is 
to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a 
product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, 
it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get.  
Secondly, where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, 
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is 
protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates 
and cheats.  This is the well-established rule of law protecting 
both the public and the trademark owner.23 
A trademark serves various economic functions for both the consumer and 
the owner.24  Trademarks allow consumers to recognize and identify products 
over time, making it easier for consumers to choose products that they like and 
avoid products that they do not.25  In turn, since consumers are able to identify 
and recognize products over time, the trademark owners have an incentive to 
                                                                                                                   
 18 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (providing federal definition, the most recognized and accepted definition 
of the term “trademark”). 
 19 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
 20 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1 
(4th ed. 2014). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946). 
 24 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 2:3. 
 25 Id. 
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produce higher quality products, and maintain that defined quality level.26  
Without trademarks to help identify products, a manufacturer would lack the 
incentive to improve the product’s quality, and sales would likely distribute 
more evenly among market’s producers, or be based completely on price.27  To 
attract customers, manufacturers would likely reduce quality in order to reduce 
price, overall lowering the economy and the satisfaction of consumers.28 
Since trademarks allow consumers to avoid unsatisfactory products from 
their past experiences and easily find products they enjoy, trademarks also 
reduce a consumer’s “search costs” of shopping and making choices that would 
involve much more independent research without trademark identification.29  
Trademarks indicate to consumers the source of the product, which in addition 
to promoting higher quality, also allows consumers to make choices on which 
companies to support, even for various reasons unrelated to the product itself.30  
Most commonly, trademarks are used for marketing and advertising the owner’s 
brand to the public.31  Trademark rights afford the owner protection over his or 
her investment in the design and promotion of the trademark, and the 
investment in the quality and goodwill built into the product and reputation.32  
In order to generate goodwill, the mark must be distinguishable from other 
marks so that consumers are able to identify the source.  In trademark law, 
marks are considered in categories along a range of distinctive.33  If a mark is 
not inherently distinctive, then to gain trademark protection, the designation 
must acquire a distinctiveness in consumers’ minds that can be proven by 
market research.34  That acquired distinctiveness is called a “secondary 
meaning.”35 
In protecting the owner’s investment and preventing indirect economic 
damage caused by consumer confusion, trademark rights encompass the right 
to exclude others from using that mark—essentially a property interest.36  But, 
this property is almost worthless without the goodwill that the product and its 
                                                                                                                   
 26 Id. § 2:4; see also Ariel Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks, 
2010 BYU L. REV. 1555 (arguing that the incentive to enhance and maintain quality standards is a 
function of trademarks distinct from lowering consumer search costs). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id.; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 2:3 (citing Landes & Posner, The Economics of 
Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1988) (“[T]rademark law . . . is trying to promote 
economic efficiency.”)). 
 29 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 2:5. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See id.; see also Katz, supra note 26, at 1555. 
 32 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 2:14. 
 33 Id. § 15:1. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
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producer have cultivated over time.37  As Justice Frankfurter stated, “[t]he aim 
is . . . to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the 
desirability of the commodity upon which it appears.  Once this is attained, the 
trademark owner has something of value.”38  This value of goodwill has been 
described as the “favorable consideration shown by the purchasing public to 
goods known to emanate from a particular source,”39 and “the advantage 
obtained by use of a trademark,”40 which is generally calculated as the business 
value of the brand above its tangible assets’ book value.41 
B.  THE LANHAM ACT 
Businesses can protect their trademarks via the common law, state 
registration, or federal registration.42  Common law trademark protection arises 
generally from the use of the trademark in commerce, and provides the 
exclusive right to use that trademark in that geographic region.43  State 
registration similarly provides protection in the state registered, and for 
purposes of this Note will be grouped with common law protection.  The 
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) provides federal protection and allows 
trademark owners to register their mark on the Principal Register established by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).44  The federal application must 
include, among other things, the type of goods connected with the trademark 
and an illustration of the trademark.45  Once federal registration is complete, the 
owner can exclude others nationwide from using the mark, or any similar mark 
that would cause a likelihood of confusion by consumers as to the source of the 
product or the sponsorship or endorsement of another product.46 
When a trademark owner applies for federal registration, the PTO examiner 
reviews the trademark to determine if the trademark is sufficiently 
distinguishable from the goods of others47 so that it will not “cause confusion, 
                                                                                                                   
 37 See id. § 2:15. 
 38 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
 39 White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle System, Etc., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937). 
 40 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 2:17. 
 41 Id. § 2:19. 
 42 Id. § 2:7. 
 43 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); see also Pace, supra note 3, at 17 (discussing how 
trademark owners can acquire trademark protection from federal registration, state registration, 
and the common law.  “Common law rights arise from adoption and use as a trade identifier; and 
nothing else need to be done to acquire common law rights.”). 
 44 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2012). 
 45 Id. § 1051(a)(2). 
 46 Id. § 1114. 
 47 Pace, supra note 3, at 20. 
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or to cause mistake, or to deceive” consumers.48  Additionally, the examiner 
ensures that the mark does not fall within any of the exclusions detailed in 
Section 2 of the Lanham Act.49  Ultimately, if the mark is approved for 
registration, the trademark is then published in the Official Gazette of the PTO in 
order to afford any person at least thirty days to file an opposition based on the 
belief that he or she would be damaged by the registration.50  If all opposition 
proves unsuccessful or no opposition is filed, the examiner will grant the federal 
registration,51 providing federal protection for ten years with an option to renew 
the registration for additional consecutive ten-year periods.52 
If the mark is refused federal registration for any reason, the applicant can 
appeal the decision to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).53  If the 
applicant is dissatisfied with the ruling of the TTAB, the applicant can 
subsequently appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, or file a civil suit in the United States District Court against the party 
who challenged the trademark’s validity.54  A trademark owner may prefer filing 
in the United States District Court because the court’s standard of review is de 
novo.55  The TTAB also handles petitions to cancel registrations, and a 
petitioner or respondent can similarly appeal to the Federal Circuit or file in a 
district court.56 
C.  THE ADVANTAGES OF FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION 
While many common law trademark rights arise from the actual use of the 
mark in commerce,57 several additional statutory rights arise under the Lanham 
Act when the mark is registered on the PTO’s Principle Register.58  These 
benefits provide an incentive for the trademark owner to federally register the 
mark, which in turn allows the USPTO to maintain accurate records of marks 
                                                                                                                   
 48 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(D). 
 49 Id. § 1052 (these exclusions include marks consisting of immoral, deceptive, or scandalous 
matter, as well as “matter that may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living 
or dead . . .”). 
 50 15 U.S.C. § 1063; see also Pace, supra note 3, at 45 (explaining that there actually is no 
requirement to prove damage or other direct economic or commercial interest harmed, and 
merely the assertion that the petitioner is offended by a trademark and he or she believes the 
trademark to be scandalous or disparaging as applied to them is sufficient to establish standing). 
 51 15 U.S.C. § 1063. 
 52 Id. §§ 1058–1059. 
 53 Id. § 1071. 
 54 Id. § 1071. 
 55 Pace, supra note 3, at 21 n.94. 
 56 15 U.S.C. § 1071. 
 57 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 58 See MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY § 4.09 (2014). 
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being used in commerce nationwide.  These statutory benefits include providing 
prima facie evidence of validity and exclusive ownership nationwide, the ability to 
use the ® symbol to provide constructive notice of federal registration, federal 
court jurisdiction, and incontestability after five years, among other benefits 
discussed in detail below.59 
First, Section 7(b) of the Lanham Act provides several rebuttable 
presumptions that immediately vest upon federal trademark registration.60  
Section 7(b) states that a certificate of registration is  
prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of 
the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the 
mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered 
mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or 
services specified in the certificate.61 
After federal registration, any person who believes he or she is damaged 
personally by a trademark may file a petition to cancel the trademark 
registration within five years; however, the petitioner bears the burden of 
proving that the mark is not entitled to federal protection in some way, both in 
a TTAB proceeding and in federal court.62  Additionally, the owner’s exclusive 
right to use the mark applies nationwide unless geographic limitations are 
included in the registration certificate.63 
After a trademark has been registered for over five years, the trademark 
owner can file for incontestable status.64  This status provides “conclusive 
evidence of the mark’s validity, its registration, the registrant’s ownership of the 
mark, and the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce.”65  
However, even after a trademark gains incontestable status,66 a person may still 
challenge the trademark registration if the mark becomes generic, is merely 
functional, has been abandoned, was fraudulently obtained, is being used to 
misrepresent the source of goods, or should not have been initially registered 
because of content-based prohibitions in Section 2.67 
                                                                                                                   
 59 Id. 
 60 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). 
 61 Id. 
 62 LOUIS ALTMAN & RUDOLF CALLMANN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 26:101 (4th ed. 2014). 
 63 Id. 
 64 15 U.S.C. § 1065. 
 65 SCOTT, supra note 58; 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). 
 66 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (a valid trademark in continuous use for five consecutive years attains 
incontestability of right to use mark under certain conditions). 
 67 Id. § 1064(3). 
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Federal trademark registration also permits the owner to use the symbol ® 
in connection with the mark to provide nationwide constructive notice of 
federal registration and protection.68  When the trademark owner consistently 
uses the ® symbol, this constructive notice provides nationwide protection of 
the owner’s exclusive rights, even in locations where the owner is not, and has 
no plans to be, engaged in commerce in that geographic area.69  This 
constructive notice also eliminates the possibility of “innocent” new users, who 
may otherwise plead ignorance to their infringing use or invoke a good faith 
defense.70  However, arguably the most important benefit of this nationwide 
constructive notice is that the federally registered trademark owner can prevent 
later applicants from registering marks that would be confusingly similar to the 
registered mark.71  Federal trademark registrations are recorded with the United 
States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, which entitle the registrant to 
stop goods bearing an infringing mark from being imported into the United 
States.72   
Federal registration also provides registrants with federal jurisdiction to file 
trademark claims.73  Besides typical injunctive relief, federal protection permits 
statutory remedies for successful infringement claims, including recovery of 
defendant’s profits, damages suffered by the plaintiff, and the cost of the civil 
action.74  When the court considers the plaintiff’s damages, the court may, at its 
discretion, enter judgment for the actual amount of damages and “for any sum 
above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such 
amount . . . [and] in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees.”75   
Additionally, only federal trademark registrants are entitled to treble 
damages for trademark counterfeiting.76  For counterfeit marks, Section 35(b) 
of the Lanham Act directs the court to enter judgment for three times the 
profits or damages, whichever amount is greater, and award reasonable attorney 
fees.77  When the counterfeit mark is used in connection with the sale or 
distribution of goods or services, the registrant can instead elect to recover 
statutory damages.78  These statutory damages start at no less than $1,000 and 
                                                                                                                   
 68 See SCOTT, supra note 58. 
 69 Todd Anten, Note, Self-Disparaging Trademarks and Social Change: Factoring the Reappropriation of 
Slurs into Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 397 (2006). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 15 U.S.C. § 1125(b). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. § 1117(a). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See LeLonde, supra note 2; 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d). 
 77 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). 
 78 Id. § 1117(c). 
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can be as high as $200,000 per counterfeit mark for each type of goods or 
service.79  However, if the court determines that the defendant willfully used the 
counterfeit mark, the statutory damages can be as high as $2 million per 
counterfeit mark for each type of goods or services sold or distributed.80  
Consequently, these additional statutory benefits provide economic and 
psychological incentives to register the mark with the PTO, and provide 
additional protection for trademark owners against infringement, confusingly 
similar marks, and counterfeiting use. 
D.  SECTION 2(A) CASE LAW 
As mentioned previously, some marks are excluded from registration 
because of the content-based prohibitions of Section 2 of the Lanham Act.81  
One such bar to registration, detailed in Section 2(a), is the prohibition against 
the registration of a mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, 
or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a 
connection with persons, living or dead, . . . or bring them into contempt, or 
disrepute.”82  For many years, courts grouped the terms “immoral,” 
“scandalous,” and “disparaging” all under a similar framework,83 with the 
distinction only recently made between “scandalous” and “disparaging.”84  A 
petition for cancellation based on this content-based prohibition is built on the 
argument that registration should not have been granted in the first place.85  
Based on the argument, tribunals look to whether the mark was scandalous or 
disparaging at the time of registration.86  The TTAB uses the same evidentiary 
standard of proof to cancel a trademark based on disparagement as it would 
when reviewing the trademark during the initial registration process—a 
preponderance of the evidence.87 
The distinction between the terms “scandalous” and “disparaging” 
demonstrates how the TTAB or a court analyzes a trademark challenge.  The 
                                                                                                                   
 79 Id. § 1117(c)(1). 
 80 Id. § 1117(c)(2). 
 81 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (marks consisting of immoral, scandalous, or disparaging matter, among 
other exclusions); see also text accompanying supra note 49. 
 82 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
 83 Rachel Clark Hughey, The Impact of Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo on Trademark Protection of Other 
Marks, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 327, 337 (2004). 
 84 See infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text (explaining that “scandalous” is more related to 
offensive or shocking to the moral conscience of society, whereas disparagement relates to 
disrespecting, diminishing, or discrediting a specific group of people). 
 85 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); see supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 86 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); see supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 87 See infra Part II.D; see also infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
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seminal case in 1939, In re Riverbank Canning Co., adopted the dictionary 
definition of scandalous: “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; 
disgraceful; offensive; disreputable . . . giving offense to the conscience or moral 
feelings.”88  Before 1994, disparagement case law, in comparison, consisted only 
of cases where disparagement was “obvious” to the examiner or TTAB, but 
never held a distinct meaning or separate framework for analysis.89  Finally, the 
TTAB in the case of In re Hines similarly adopted the dictionary’s plain meaning 
of disparagement: “to lower in esteem or reputation; diminish the respect for; to 
speak slightingly of; . . . depreciate; belittle; to bring reproach or discredit 
upon.”90  This clarification led the TTAB thereafter to treat disparaging marks 
under a separate framework from scandalous marks.91 
In order to deny a mark federal registration based on its scandalous nature, 
courts have held that the mark must offend a “substantial composite of the 
general population,”92 viewed “in the context of contemporary attitudes.”93  
The TTAB determined that for disparaging marks, on the other hand, the 
perceptions of the general population are “irrelevant,” and instead consider only 
the opinions of “those referred to, identified or implicated in some recognizable 
manner by the involved mark.”94  
The first trademark case involving a refusal to federally register a trademark 
on grounds of disparagement was Doughboy Industries v. Reese Chemical Co., 
decided in 1951.  The examiner in this case concluded that the mark “Dough-
Boy” for “a prophylactic preparation for the prevention of venereal disease” 
was “obviously” disparaging to American World War I soldiers—commonly 
referred to as doughboys—especially since the package depicted an American 
soldier.95  Additional cases where an examiner determined marks were obviously 
disparaging followed, such as the case of “Senussi” cigarettes held to be 
disparaging to the Senussi religious sect, which forbids smoking,96 and a case 
                                                                                                                   
 88 In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938). 
 89 Jessica M. Kiser, How Dykes on Bikes Got It Right: Procedural Inequities Inherent in the Trademark 
Office’s Review of Disparaging Trademarks, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 8 (2011). 
 90 In re Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1685, 1688 (T.T.A.B. 1994). 
 91 See infra note 94. 
 92 In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re McGinley, 
660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). 
 93 Id. (citing In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1219 (T.T.A.B. 1993)). 
 94 In re Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1688. 
 95 Pace, supra note 3, at 27 (citing Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. Reese Chem. Co., 88 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 227 (P.T.O. 1951)). 
 96 See In re Reemtsma Cigarettenbabriken, 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959). 
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involving a mark depicting a large X over a hammer and sickle, determined to 
be disparaging to the Communist party.97 
Finally, in Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds Inc., the TTAB created an objective 
test for disparaging marks.98  In order to find a mark disparaging under 
Greyhound’s test, the TTAB requires “(1) that the communication reasonably 
would be understood as referring to the plaintiff; and (2) that the 
communication is disparaging, that it would be considered offensive or 
objectionable by a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.”99  In this case, 
the TTAB adopted the definition of disparagement from the Second 
Restatement of Torts,100 which was more applicable to Greyhound’s situation in 
which one trademark was considered disparaging to another trademark by 
comparison.101   
In the pivotal racial disparagement case of Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.102 (Harjo 
I), the TTAB cancelled Pro-Football’s six federal trademark registrations 
relating to the Washington Redskins, finding the marks racially disparaging to 
Native Americans.103  The TTAB created a two-part test, derived partly from In 
re Hines104 and distinguished from the test used in Greyhound.105  First, the Harjo 
test examines the likely “meaning of the matter in question, as it appears in the 
marks and as those marks are used in connection with the services identified in 
the registrations.”106  This examination includes looking at dictionary 
definitions, the elements comprising the mark as a whole, the product or service 
connected to the mark, and the mark’s use in commerce.107  Second, the test 
requires the examiner to assess whether that meaning, in consideration of the 
factors listed above, may disparage a substantial composite of the complaining 
party’s group.108 
The TTAB in Harjo I followed In re Hines by reiterating that the perceptions 
of the general public are irrelevant; only the opinions of the supposedly 
referenced group are relevant in the examination.109  Additionally, the TTAB 
                                                                                                                   
 97 See In re Anti-Communist World Freedom Cong., Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 304 (T.T.A.B. 
1969). 
 98 Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (T.T.A.B. 1988). 
 99 Id. at 1639. 
 100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 629 (1977) (“A statement is disparaging if it is 
understood to cast doubt upon the quality of another’s land, chattels or intangible things. . . .”). 
 101 See Pace, supra note 3, at 30. 
 102 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999). 
 103 Id. at 1738. 
 104 See supra note 94. 
 105 Harjo I, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1740; see supra note 99. 
 106 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1740–41. 
 107 Kiser, supra note 89, at 9. 
 108 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741. 
 109 Id. at 1738–39; see supra note 94. 
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clarified that for a cancellation proceeding, “the dates of the registration of the 
marks herein” should be used for both parts of the test, pursuant to Section 14 
of the Lanham Act.110  After balancing the factors in the first part of its test, the 
TTAB concluded that the “Redskins” mark both referred to the professional 
football team and alluded to Native Americans, at the time of registration.111  
As for the second part of its test, the TTAB found that the use of Native 
American references by non-Native Americans was not per se disparaging.112  
However, the TTAB concluded that the petitioners had established, by at least a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the use of the “Redskins” marks may 
disparage Native Americans in the view of a substantial composite of Native 
Americans and therefore cancelled their federal trademark protection.113   
Recently, the TTAB recognized three scenarios in which a mark is 
disparaging.114  These three scenarios include: 
(1) an innocuous term that in the context of the goods or services 
is disparaging . . . , (2) a disparaging term that may have a non-
disparaging meaning in a specific context . . . , or (3) a disparaging 
term that has no non-disparaging meanings in any context, and 
remains disparaging despite the applicant’s goods or services, 
actual use or intent.115 
The third scenario was extensively examined in In re Heeb Media LLC, a case 
in which the TTAB determined that “Heeb” was disparaging to Jewish people 
in any context.116  The TTAB concluded that despite the trademark applicant’s 
good intentions and the associated product’s non-offensive nature, the 
trademark itself was disparaging.117  This case was decided almost ten years after 
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., but may be relied upon during the renewed Redskins 
trademark litigation of Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse.118 
                                                                                                                   
 110 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012); see supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 111 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1742. 
 112 Id. at 1743. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See LaLonde, supra note 2. 
 115 In re Shiao Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305, 1309–10 (T.T.A.B. 2013). 
 116 In re Heeb Media LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014); see infra notes 
172–75 and accompanying text. 
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E.  PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE VS. CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE 
There are three generally accepted evidentiary standards of proof: (1) a 
preponderance of the evidence, (2) clear and convincing evidence, and (3) 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.119  These different standards stem from 
the Due Process Clause and emerged over time, in order to “instruct the 
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should 
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
adjudication.”120  A preponderance evidentiary standard is generally stated as 
“more likely than not.”121  A clear and convincing evidentiary standard requires 
an intermediate degree of confidence, generally viewed as “much more likely 
than not.”  Third, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard requires the highest 
degree of confidence from the fact finder, and is the standard required in 
criminal cases.122  These different standards are also used as a way to “allocate 
the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance 
attached to the ultimate decision.”123  
In holding that a judicial outcome should not swing from no recovery to full 
recovery based on a small difference in the weight of evidence and the standard 
of proof, courts have typically applied the preponderance standard in civil cases, 
especially to civil cases which have little to no societal impact.124  This 
evidentiary standard indicates the court’s opinion that an erroneous verdict for 
the plaintiff would be no more or less serious than an erroneous verdict for the 
defendant.125  On the other hand, a clear and convincing evidentiary standard is 
often applied in civil cases in which the interests at stake, particularly those of 
the defendant, are greater than mere damage awards.  This higher standard 
reduces the risk of error to the defendant by raising the plaintiff’s burden of 
proof.126  Use of this higher standard similarly indicates the court’s opinion that 
an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff would cause more harm than an erroneous 
verdict for the defendant. 
                                                                                                                   
 119 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 243, 251 (2002) (discussing how the establishment of truth in adjudications is often a 
matter of probabilities, so the law sets differing standards of required probability at levels that 
match the judicial system’s goals). 
 120 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 121 Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 119, at 251.  
 122 Id. 
 123 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). 
 124 Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 119, at 252. 
 125 Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 126 Addington, 441 U.S. at 424.  See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (discussing 
deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) (discussing denaturalization). 
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Although the Lanham Act is silent on the appropriate evidentiary standard 
to use when deciding whether to cancel a federal trademark registration, the 
court in Material Supply International, Inc. v. Sunmatch Industrial Company127 
concluded that the preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate.  
Both parties in that case contested rightful ownership of a trademark which the 
PTO granted to Material Supply, with Sunmatch arguing it already owned the 
trademark rights in Taiwan and had used the mark in commerce within the 
United States.  Citing precedent for its decision, the court used the 
preponderance of the evidence standard for the cancellation petition, 
comparing the situation to a petition based on the abandonment of a 
trademark128 and another on the likelihood of confusion between two marks.129 
In the second case cited as precedent—Massey Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion 
Institute of Technology130—the Court entertained the argument suggesting that 
since federal registration is prima facie evidence of exclusive ownership, there is a 
presumption that there should be no likelihood of confusion with previously 
registered marks; therefore, the petitioner has a “heavier” burden to overcome 
that presumption in a cancellation proceeding versus an opposition hearing 
during a mark’s registration process.131  The Court, however, found no statutory 
support for this argument, and concluded that “without some statutory 
direction, a preponderance of the evidence will usually be ‘sufficient’ in both 
cases.’ ”132  In Harjo I, the TTAB relied on Material Supply’s reasoning and 
applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof during the 
cancellation proceeding. 
F.  THE REDSKINS’ CONTINUING LEGAL BATTLE 
The professional football team currently based in Washington, D.C., has 
been called the “Redskins” since 1933.133  In 1967, Pro-Football applied for 
federal registration for its Redskins trademarks, and registered subsequent 
alterations throughout the years, with its last registration in 1990.134  In Harjo I, 
the Native American petitioners asserted that the term “redskin . . . was and is a 
pejorative, derogatory, denigrating, offensive, scandalous, contemptuous, 
                                                                                                                   
 127 146 F.3d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 128 Cerveceria Centroamerica, S.A. v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 892 F.2d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 129 Massey Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 492 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 1403. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Erik Brady & Megan Finnerty, Washington Redskins Appeal Decision to Cancel Trademark, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 14, 2014, available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/redskins/2014/ 
08/14/washington-redskins-appeal-federal-trademark-registrations/14066527/. 
 134 Id. 
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disreputable, disparaging and racist designation for a Native American 
person.”135  Therefore, the Petitioners argued that the federal registrations 
should be void ab initio under Section 14 of the Lanham Act136 because the 
registrations fell under to the content-based prohibitions of Section 2(a).137  
In response, Pro-Football, Inc. contended that the trademark had acquired a 
strong secondary meaning from its long and widespread use in advertising and 
promotion to identify the entertainment services of the Washington D.C. 
football team, and therefore the trademarks “cannot reasonably be understood 
to refer to [Native Americans].”138  Pro-Football also argued that Section 2(a) of 
the Lanham Act is an unconstitutional regulation of commercial speech under 
the First Amendment, with too broad of an interpretation given to the terms 
“scandalous” and “disparaging.”139  Although the TTAB responded that it did 
not have the authoritative power to strike Section 2(a) as unconstitutional, Pro-
Football nevertheless argued that the TTAB was “obliged to apply the statute’s 
terms in a constitutional manner.”140  The TTAB, however, found Pro-
Football’s brief “unpersuasive” and granted the petitioner’s motion to strike 
those affirmative defenses.141 
To prove disparagement, the Native American petitioners provided a 
linguistics expert, who testified that the primary use of the word “redskin” is to 
refer to Native Americans.142  They also provided evidence that the word 
“redskin” is “used with connotations of violence, savagery, and 
oppression . . . suggest[ing] a power relationship, with the whites in control, and 
the Indians in a position of servitude or capture,” and is considered worse than 
other slang words referencing Native Americans.143  The linguistics expert 
concluded that even when the word “redskins” appears in the team name 
“Washington Redskins,” the term “has not acquired ‘a meaning that somehow 
is divorced from or independent of its use in referring to Native 
Americans.’ ”144   
Petitioners also used a telephone survey as central evidence for 
disparagement, which polled the general population and Native Americans 
                                                                                                                   
 135 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1708 (T.T.A.B. 1999). 
 136 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (if the federal trademark registration was obtained contrary to the 
provisions of Section 2(a), for example, its legal status would be considered to have never been 
valid or enforceable). 
 137 Harjo I, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1719. 
 138 Id. at 1708. 
 139 Id. at 1710. 
 140 Id. (citing the respondent’s brief, p. 29, emphasis in original). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 1720. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
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about their perceptions of the term “redskin” to reference Native Americans.145  
The survey provided eight terms which could be used to reference Native 
Americans and asked if each term was “offensive” to the survey taker directly, 
and whether the survey taker believed that others might be offended.146  
According to the survey findings, approximately forty-six percent of the general 
population considered “redskin” offensive, compared to only thirty-seven 
percent of Native Americans.147 
For evidence of its contradictory argument, Pro-Football provided its own 
linguistics experts who testified that the term “redskin,” alone without context, 
is purely a denotative term, used as a neutral reference to Native Americans.148  
Additionally, Pro-Football argued that its long and widespread use of the term 
in connection with their professional football services has granted the term 
“Redskins” a strong secondary meaning, “separate and distinct from the core, 
ethnic meaning.”149  Consequently, its use relating to football entertainment 
services “has absolutely no negative effect on the word’s neutrality — and, 
indeed, serves to enhance the word’s already positive associations.”150  Next, 
Pro-Football argued for the requirement of intent to disparage by the speaker, 
and that its trademarks “do not rise to the level of crudeness and vulgarity that 
the Board has required [in the past],” and therefore fail to disparage any group 
of Native Americans.151  
Pro-Football also argued that the petitioners’ telephone survey was flawed 
because it considered the wrong time period and population segment, and that 
the term “redskin” should have been contextualized by its connection with 
football entertainment services.152  Pro-Football’s survey expert further 
contended that the survey posed leading questions, that the parameters of the 
survey could not deduce the perceptions of people in 1967 (the time of the 
mark’s registration), and that statistical analysis demonstrated the survey’s weak 
statistical significance.153  The TTAB recognized many of these flaws, but 
overall concluded that the survey was a valuable collection of current 
perceptions regarding the term “redskin,” and still relevant in its final 
decision.154 
                                                                                                                   
 145 Id. at 1732. 
 146 Id. at 1732–33 (the survey expert chose to use “offensive” as the closest synonym that would 
embody the terms “scandalous”  or “disparaging” for someone unfamiliar with trademark law). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 1720. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 1721. 
 152 Id. at 1720. 
 153 Id. at 1733. 
 154 Id. at 1734. 
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Ultimately, the TTAB determined that the meaning of the term “redskin” 
does refer to Native Americans: “it would be both factually incomplete and 
disingenuous to ignore the substantial evidence of Native American imagery 
used by respondent.”155  Thus, the TTAB disagreed with Pro-Football’s 
contention that the trademark “Redskins” purely denoted the Washington 
football team, and by usage had lost any connection to Native Americans.156  As 
for the second part of the test, it found that the petitioners had “established, by 
at least a preponderance of the evidence,” that Pro-Football’s “Redskins” 
trademarks may disparage Native Americans.157  The TTAB admitted that no 
one piece of evidence was convincing alone, but based its conclusion “on the 
cumulative effect of the entire record.”158 
After the TTAB handed down its decision, Pro-Football filed a civil suit in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, requesting a de novo 
review pursuant to Section 21(b) of the Lanham Act.159  After both parties 
moved for various summary judgments, the district court reviewed the TTAB’s 
findings of fact under the substantial evidence test,160 which originates from the 
Administrative Procedure Act.161  This “substantial evidence” standard of 
review would reverse the TTAB’s findings of fact only if those findings were 
“unsupported by substantial evidence.”162  This standard guided the court in 
reviewing whether a “ ‘reasonable mind might accept’ a particular evidentiary 
record as ‘adequate to support a conclusion.’ ”163   
The district court determined that the TTAB’s findings of fact were not 
supported by substantial evidence, “[were] logically flawed, and fail[ed] to apply 
the correct legal standard to its own findings of fact.”164  The court concluded 
that there was no direct evidence that the trademarks disparaged Native 
Americans at the time of registration, and in the context of the product and 
services connected to the marks.165  The court also concurrently overturned the 
                                                                                                                   
 155 Id. at 1742. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 1743. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 160 Id. at 102. 
 161 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 162 Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 114 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
 163 Id. at 115–16 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 
 164 Id. at 126. 
 165 Id. at 127. 
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TTAB’s decision based on the doctrine of laches.166  The TTAB considered the 
constitutional claims moot, and therefore did not rule upon them.167 
The Native American petitioners appealed the decision to determine the 
legitimacy of Pro-Football’s laches defense, which needed to be overturned to 
proceed on the merits of disparagement.  The court of appeals determined that 
the district court incorrectly judged laches from the time of trademark 
registration instead of from the time at which the complaining party reached 
majority, and remanded.168  On remand, the district court again confirmed Pro-
Football’s laches defense based on both trial prejudice and economic prejudice 
to Pro-Football, but reiterated that this determination “should not be read 
as . . . making any statement on the appropriateness of Native American 
imagery for team names.”169   
Finally, in 2009, the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s 
decision, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
found the laches defense appropriate.170  The court of appeals found that the 
Washington Redskins had invested considerable capital in promoting its 
trademarks as part of its advertising strategy during the eight years after all 
petitioners reached the age of majority and unreasonably chose to delay 
pursuing their claim.171 
This issue for the Washington Redskins has now resurfaced after the TTAB 
has yet again cancelled six federal trademark registrations owned by Pro-
Football in the case of Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., decided June 2014.172  A 
different group of Native Americans initiated a cancellation proceeding in 2006, 
which the TTAB intentionally postponed until after the Harjo decision.173  The 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia will now decide the 
disparagement issue on the merits since the new set of petitioners have all 
recently reached the age of majority, negating the viability of a laches defense.174  
Pro-Football and the Native American petitioners have both agreed, with 
                                                                                                                   
 166 Id. at 136 (noting that the defense of laches is an affirmative defense in which a legal claim 
will not be enforced or allowed when a long delay in asserting the right or claim has prejudiced 
the adverse party). 
 167 Id. 
 168 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 169 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46, 62 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting 284 F. Supp. 2d 
at 144), aff’d, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 170 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 171 Id. 
 172 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
 173 Id. 
 174 See Alicia Jessop, Inside The Legal Fight To Change The Washington Redskins’ Name, FORBES.COM, 
Oct. 15, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2013/09/30/why-the-raiders-may-hol 
d-the-key-to-the-as-leaving-oakland/. 
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minimal exceptions, to allow Harjo’s evidentiary record to be considered as 
evidence in this proceeding as well.175  Ultimately, the potential loss of Pro-
Football’s federal trademark protection would extremely impair the Washington 
Redskins franchise, but reward a major victory for Native Americans who have 
fought for the Redskins to change its team’s name. 
III.  THE ARGUMENT FOR A HIGHER EVIDENTIARY STANDARD IN 
TRADEMARK CANCELLATION PROCEEDINGS BASED ON DISPARAGEMENT 
Section 14 of the Lanham Act explicitly states that a federal trademark 
registration can be cancelled at any time if the registration was contrary to 
content-based prohibitions, such as disparagement.176  However, Section 14 
does not state which evidentiary standard the TTAB or a court should use when 
determining whether a mark may disparage.  This Note argues that for legal, 
economic, and public policy reasons, tribunals should implement a higher 
evidentiary standard when they consider cancelling an incontestable federal 
trademark registration based on disparagement, compared to when the mark is 
reviewed during the initial registration process.  Nationally well-known, 
incontestable trademarks should hold the benefit of the doubt and the PTO 
should instead use a clear and convincing evidentiary standard for cancellation 
proceedings based on disparagement, as opposed to the preponderance of the 
evidence standard used when it initially considers a mark for registration. 
A.  LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Although the district court in Pro-Football v. Harjo determined that a 
preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate,177 this Note argues 
that this conclusion was erroneous.  Cancellation proceedings based on 
disparagement are distinguishable from other petitions for cancellation, and 
should require a clear and convincing evidentiary standard.  As the district court 
stated, “the TTAB failed to remark that in the context of cancellation 
proceedings where a lengthy period of time ensues between registration and the 
cancellation request, the Board is required to pay even closer attention to the 
proof adduced to buttress the cancellation request.”178   
The district court in Pro-Football cited McCarthy’s treatise on trademarks, 
which states:  
                                                                                                                   
 175 Blackhorse, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080. 
 176 Id. § 1064(3). 
 177 Pro-Football, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 96. 
 178 Id. at 123.  
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Cancellation of a valuable registration around which a valuable 
business [goodwill] has been built, should be granted only with 
“due caution and after a most careful study of all the 
facts” . . . The cancellation of one’s trademark may prove 
destructive to the business built about it.  Surely, no registration 
should be cancelled hastily and without a most careful study of all 
the facts.179 
Even though the district court concluded that the preponderance of the 
evidence standard was sufficient for cancellation proceedings, it agreed that an 
examiner should apply a more stringent study of the facts when reviewing 
petitions for cancellation after a substantial delay in time.  When a trademark 
has attained incontestability, as the Redskins trademarks have, there should not 
merely be a more stringent study of the facts, which can be highly subjective, 
but a higher evidentiary standard of proof compared to when the PTO initially 
reviewed the mark for registration. 
As support for concluding that a preponderance of the evidence was 
appropriate, the district court in Pro-Football v. Harjo cited Material Supply, a case 
where ownership was contested between only two litigants, which in turn cited 
a case regarding abandonment and another case regarding the likelihood of 
confusion between two marks.180  In cases where two private litigants are 
involved, fighting over the same trademark, a preponderance of the evidence 
standard seems appropriate since the risk of error would not be more or less 
detrimental to one litigant or the other.  However, in another case of trademark 
abandonment, the court in Eurostar, Inc. v. “Euro-Star” Reitmoden GMBH & 
Company (cited by Pro-Football) used a clear and convincing evidentiary 
standard for the cancellation proceeding.181  This difference in evidentiary 
standards is irreconcilable with the abandonment case cited by Material Supply.  
When considering cancelling a well-known, incontestable federal trademark 
registration based on disparagement, the tribunal should realize that this is not 
just a case between two litigants fighting over the exclusive use of a property 
right, but a case with a substantial societal impact where the risk of error may be 
far more detrimental to the registrant than to the petitioners. 
Before courts made the distinction between “scandalous” and “disparaging” 
marks, trademarks were typically barred from registration or cancelled based on 
                                                                                                                   
 179 Id. (citing 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 20:64) (cited with approval in Material Supply, 146 F.3d 
at 989–90)). 
 180 See supra Part II.D. 
 181 Eurostar, Inc. v. “Euro-Star” Reitmoden GMBH & Co., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1266 (T.T.A.B. 
1994) (explaining that “abandonment is generally regarded as a forfeiture of rights and the courts 
and the Board have required strict or clear and convincing proof before finding abandonment”). 
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disparagement only in “obvious” circumstances, as exemplified in Doughboy 
Industries and In re Reemtsma.182  During a cancellation proceeding, a tribunal 
should also consider that the PTO had an opportunity to bar the registration by 
finding disparagement on its own, but more importantly, a potentially 
disparaged group already had an opportunity to oppose the registration, and 
had an additional five years to petition for its cancellation before it reached 
incontestable status.183  After reaching incontestable status, a registration may 
still be cancelled at any time if it was registered contrary to the content-based 
prohibitions of Section 2(a), (b), or (c), but a more stringent evidentiary 
standard should be necessary.  Otherwise, a laches defense should apply, as it 
did in Pro-Football v. Harjo.184  Although laches is properly judged from the 
petitioner’s age of majority, if the adult leaders of the supposedly referenced 
group had time to oppose or petition against this mark, that past opportunity 
should be taken into consideration.  Additionally, without a clear definition for 
“a substantial composite” of the referenced group that is potentially disparaged, 
the TTAB and federal courts should require clear and convincing evidence that 
the trademark, at the time of registration and in the complete context of the 
goods or services it relates to, disparages that “substantial composite.”185   
B.  ECONOMIC ARGUMENT 
Second, the economic harm resulting from the loss of federal trademark 
protection includes losing goodwill, a possible decrease in overall quality of the 
owner’s goods or services, and increasing consumer search costs.  Additionally, 
the loss of nationwide federal protection also means the loss of consistent 
governing law, statutory and treble damages for infringement, and statutory 
remedies for counterfeit use.186  In turn, the loss of nationwide constructive 
notice means that infringers may claim good faith or ignorance when using the 
mark or any similarly confusing mark,187 making the combat against 
infringement or misappropriation much more difficult and costly for the 
trademark owner.   
The loss of consistent governing law creates economic and psychological 
problems for trademark owners, who likely lack the resources to monitor 
infringing use and prosecute it in fifty different states.  After cancellation, fewer 
negative consequences for infringers and counterfeit importers could lead to the 
                                                                                                                   
 182 See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 183 See supra Part II.B. 
 184 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 185 See supra Part II.C. 
 186 See supra Part IV. 
 187 See supra Part II.A. 
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deterioration of consumer trust, brand loyalty, and product quality.188  
Trademark owners that still effectively operate nationwide without federal 
protection would seemingly not have the time, energy, or resources to prosecute 
in numerous state courts with inconsistent governing laws. 
The corresponding loss of statutory and treble damages makes prosecuting 
infringement far less appealing.  Lost profits and actual damages are typically 
much harder to prove, so the losses of statutory and treble damages make 
lawsuits much more time-consuming and expensive, and less financially 
rewarding.  Additionally, when a registrant loses the rebuttable presumption of 
ownership and validity that comes with registration, the trademark owner’s 
burden of proof escalates without any prima facie evidence on their side.189  
The loss of nationwide constructive notice allows for “innocent” infringers to 
claim good faith or ignorance, who are typically only then enjoined without a 
judgment ordering them to pay monetary damages.  Finally, without federal 
protection, the trademark owner cannot collect attorney fees and other costs 
incurred under the Lanham Act.190 
Suddenly losing federal trademark protection also leads to other indirect 
economic consequences for the producer and everyone he does business 
with—suppliers, distributors, and licensees for example.  The suppliers and 
distributors connected with the producer may lose business when the trademark 
owner’s business shrinks, which therefore affects all of the producer’s, 
supplier’s, and distributor’s employees and shareholders.  Through no fault of 
their own, employees and shareholders feel the shock of economic loss of 
property rights throughout the supply chain.  After cancellation, licensees of the 
trademark would likely value the mark lower than when it had federal 
protection, depriving trademark owners of the economic advantages of legally 
licensing the mark because cheaper infringing and counterfeit marks may also 
be available. 
For example, if the Washington Redskins were to lose their federal 
trademark protection, Pro-Football may not have the financial incentive to 
bring suit very often, allowing infringing and counterfeit marks to creep into the 
market without much deterrent.  Pro-Football would lose nationwide 
constructive notice and border protection against the importation of products 
with infringing or counterfeit marks.  Additionally, the loss of federal protection 
means Pro-Football will have to sue in state courts and find personal 
jurisdiction for each defendant, while prosecuting under inconsistent state laws.  
Pro-Football will likely have an economic incentive to curtail the infringement 
                                                                                                                   
 188 See supra Part V.A. 
 189 See supra Part IV, para. 2. 
 190 15 U.S.C. § 1117; see supra Part IV, paras. 5–6. 
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only when an infringing source is large enough in scale to affect the market 
price of Redskins merchandise.  All of this ultimately diminishes the brand of 
the Washington Redskins, currently valued at $214 million.191  Numerous 
companies in business with the Redskins and thousands of related employees 
will likely feel the trickle-down effect of this economic harm.  The loss of 
goodwill and cannibalization of the Redskins’ merchandise revenue may 
ultimately lead the team to change its name.  Changing the team’s name comes 
with additional costs, including losing the previous investments made in the 
Redskins name and logo, and the additional investments of creating and 
marketing a new name and logo, while possibly losing customers in the 
process.192  Because of these potential economic harms identified for a 
trademark owner facing cancellation, as well as the harm caused to others doing 
business with the trademark owner, the registrant’s interests at stake outweigh 
any potential harm to petitioners caused by the alleged disparagement.  
Therefore, in order to properly allocate the risk of error between the trademark 
owner and the potentially disparaged group in a cancellation proceeding, the 
TTAB and courts should require clear and convincing evidence, as it does in 
comparable contexts.  This higher evidentiary standard for cancellation 
proceedings would more equitably balance the risk of error, safeguarding the 
trademark owner from a constant threat of cancellation that can occur even 
after the mark becomes incontestable. 
C.  POLICY ARGUMENT 
Third, there are several public policy reasons why a clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard should be used in cancellation proceedings of an allegedly 
disparaging trademark.  The dual nature of trademark law—both to protect the 
producer’s property rights and also protect consumers from fraud and 
confusion193—creates various fundamental reasons why well-known, 
incontestable trademarks deserve relief from the constant threat of cancellation 
for disparagement.  From the producer’s perspective, federal trademark 
registration protects additional investment, not only in further development of 
the trademark, but also in marketing and advertising the goods or services 
connected with that trademark.  Federal registration allows for nationwide 
constructive notice, even to areas not yet commercially served,194 protecting 
producers’ investments from dilution, tarnishment, or infringement in 
geographic areas that otherwise would not provide protection.  Additionally, 
                                                                                                                   
 191 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 192 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 193 See supra Part II.A. 
 194 See supra Part IV, para. 4. 
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these property rights extend further than the mark itself, rewarding the goodwill 
that the company has garnered throughout the life cycle of the brand, as the 
Washington Redskins have, for example, since 1933.195  Most trademark 
registrants refrain from making significant investments to increase their national 
goodwill until after the trademark is federally registered.  However, because a 
petitioner may initiate a cancellation proceeding based on disparagement at any 
time,196 trademark registrants constantly face the threat of losing federal 
protection, making any investment more risky.   
From a consumer’s perspective, trademarks protect them against fraud and 
confusion as to source, allowing consumers to identify goods and services they 
desire.197  This efficiency reduces consumers’ search costs, in turn promoting 
higher overall quality in the market.198  When a well-known trademark suddenly 
loses its federal protection, disincentives to free ride or counterfeit a mark 
decrease.199  Consumers could routinely be confused as to the source and 
quality of the goods or services they are receiving.  Consumers would then no 
longer be able to trust retailers, increasing consumers search costs and likely 
lowering the price they are willing to pay.200  Without federal protection to 
promote and maintain standards of high quality, the market deteriorates and 
becomes less efficient.201  Although the cancellation of federal protection does 
not require a producer to stop using that mark, the economic and psychological 
effects would likely influence producers to adopt a different trademark.202  If 
this occurred, consumers could lose the connection to the brand.203  
Additionally, the producer would lose some, if not all, of its national goodwill 
developed in the brand.204  For the Redskins, a new team name may mean a loss 
of fan loyalty without the personal attachment and camaraderie associated with 
the new team. 
On the other hand, some commentators argue that the Equal Protection 
Clause205 should provide protection against disparagement, no matter how small 
the economic and political influence of the group potentially disparaged.206  
                                                                                                                   
 195 See supra Part II.A. 
 196 See supra Part II.B. 
 197 See supra Part II.A. 
 198 See supra Part II.A. 
 199 See supra Part IV, paras. 5–6. 
 200 See supra Part II.A.  
 201 See supra Part II.A. 
 202 See Pace, supra note 3. 
 203 See supra Part II.A. 
 204 See supra Part II.A. 
 205 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 206 See, e.g., Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, The Indians’ Chief Problem: Chief Wahoo as State Sponsored 
Discrimination and a Disparaging Mark, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 211 (1998) (discussing how the 
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However, the law should balance the purposes of trademark law and the 
psychological harm to the potentially disparaged group in a way that promotes 
societal progress, economic efficiency, and freedom of expression.  This Note 
will not delve into the constitutional arguments made by Pro-Football207 
regarding freedom of commercial speech relating to the Lanham Act’s content-
based prohibitions.  Regardless, the best way to balance these equitable 
consequences would be for the TTAB to require clear and convincing evidence 
of disparagement when considering cancelling a well-known, incontestable 
trademark. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, a petition for cancellation of a well-known, incontestable 
trademark based on disparagement should require more than just a 
preponderance of the evidence because this type of proceeding is 
distinguishable from other petitions between two private litigants fighting over 
ha property right.  Clear and convincing evidence from the petitioner should be 
required to prove that a “substantial composite” of the referenced group was 
disparaged at the time of registration in the context of the goods or services the 
trademark was connected with.  Legal reasoning, economic theory, and public 
policy each support this higher evidentiary standard. 
This Note argues that tribunals should apply a clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard when considering cancelling a well-known, incontestable 
trademark based on disparagement, such as when a district court again reviews 
the Washington Redskins trademarks in the near future in Blackhorse v. Pro-
Football.  This argument is based on legal reasoning demonstrating that a clear 
and convincing evidentiary standard is more appropriate to balance the risk of 
error between the registrant and petitioners, the economic harm resulting from 
suddenly losing federal trademark protection, and public policy relating to the 
fundamental purposes of trademark rights. 
The Redskins trademarks, for example, connect millions of consumers with 
the professional football entertainment services provided by Pro-Football 
relating to the team based in Washington, D.C.  Although the trademark owner 
would still have common law trademark rights, the loss of federal trademark 
protection would severely harm that team’s national brand by limiting the 
effectiveness and profitability of prosecuting infringement and disabling them 
from stopping counterfeit marks from being imported into the United States.  
                                                                                                                   
Cleveland Indians’ mascot could be sufficiently regarded as state sponsored with sufficient 
discriminatory intent such that it could be challenged as a violation of equal protection). 
 207  See supra Part III, para. 2. 
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The team may ultimately decide to use a different name and trademark, which 
may lead to a loss of customer loyalty, goodwill, and sunken investment costs, 
while increasing investment costs to develop a new team name and mark.   
Evidentiary standards are used to balance the risk of erroneous verdicts for 
each side, indicate the relative importance of the decision in society, and help 
instruct the factfinder on what degree of confidence our society believes he 
should have in the correctness of his decision.  While a preponderance of the 
evidence standard essentially indicates that an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff 
is no more or less serious than an erroneous verdict for the defendant, a clear 
and convincing evidentiary standard places a higher burden on the plaintiff 
either because the interests at stake between the two litigants are unbalanced in 
favor of protecting the defendant’s interests or because the equitable or societal 
impact of the decision is more important than to leave to a preponderance.  In 
the case of a well-known, incontestable trademark owner against a supposedly 
referenced group that feels disparaged, such as Pro-Football’s legal battle 
against a small group of Native Americans, the risk of error should tilt in favor 
of the trademark owner and lead the court to require clear and convincing 
evidence to cancel an incontestable trademark based on disparagement.  
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